vestihИзвестия Национальной академии наук Беларуси. Серия гуманитарных наукProceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, Humanitarian Series2524-23692524-2377The Republican Unitary Enterprise Publishing House "Belaruskaya Navuka"10.29235/2524-2369-2025-70-1-28-39vestih-1062Research ArticleФИЛОСОФИЯ И СОЦИОЛОГИЯPHILOSOPHY AND SOCIOLOGYПроблема порядков знания в эпистемологииKnowledge orders problem in epistemologyhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-9683-0601КардашА. М.KardashA. M.

Кардаш Алексей Михайлович – аспирант. Институт философии

ул. Сурганова, 1, корп.  2, 220072, Минск

Aleksey M. Kardash – Postgraduate student

1 Surganov Str., Bldg 2, Minsk 220072

krdwalexei@gmail.comИнститут философии Национальной академии наук БеларусиInstitute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus20252901202570128-­39Copyright © Кардаш А.М., 20252025Кардаш А.М.Kardash A.M.Данная работа распространяется под лицензией Creative Commons Attribution 4.0.This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 License.https://vestihum.belnauka.by/jour/article/view/1062

Рассматриваются КК-­принцип и связанная с ним категория порядков знания. Определяется характер сложившейся эпистемологической дискуссии, ставится проблема разрастающихся порядков знания и предлагается решение, связывающее порядки знания с концепцией эпистемической истории Алвина Голдмана.

Во введении обозначается, что исследование КК-­принципа является наиболее активно разрабатываемой метакогнитивной темой современной эпистемологии. Само же метапознание является областью междисциплинарных исследований, где философия может предложить прояснение некоторых концепций, в частности, идеи порядков знания, которая зачастую некритично «онтологизируется». В основной части статьи рассматривается характер исследования КК-­принципа, которое происходит на стыке между эпистемологией и эпистемической логикой. Показывается разница между категоричной и некатегоричной формулировками принципа. Обозначается связанный с КК­принципом спектр тематик от исследования логических парадоксов до практических следствий, касающихся оценки когнитивных способностей животных. Далее ставится проблема разрастающихся порядков знания, состоящая в том, что если знанию менее высокого порядка всегда соответствует знание более высокого порядка, то неясно, какого порядка знания достаточно, чтобы утвердить наличие знания первого порядка. В заключении предлагается понимание порядков знания как номинального обозначения, относящегося к сфере нормативности и языковой прагматики.

This article examines how the debate over KK principle (Knowing that One Knows) introduces the notion of knowledge orders into epistemology, which standardly involves a division into first­ and second­order knowledge. The uncritical understanding of knowledge orders leads to their naive ontologization, which has negative theoretical and practical consequences. One such consequence is the problem of proliferating orders of knowledge, which consists in the fact that if knowledge of a lower order always corresponds to knowledge of a higher order, it is not clear what order is needed to possess first­order knowledge. As a solution, it is proposed to understand knowledge orders as a nominal designation related to the evaluation of the position of knowledge in epistemic history (as this concept is understood by Alvin Goldman).

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The authors declare that there are no conflicts of interest present.