Knowledge orders problem in epistemology
https://doi.org/10.29235/2524-2369-2025-70-1-28-39
Abstract
This article examines how the debate over KK principle (Knowing that One Knows) introduces the notion of knowledge orders into epistemology, which standardly involves a division into first and secondorder knowledge. The uncritical understanding of knowledge orders leads to their naive ontologization, which has negative theoretical and practical consequences. One such consequence is the problem of proliferating orders of knowledge, which consists in the fact that if knowledge of a lower order always corresponds to knowledge of a higher order, it is not clear what order is needed to possess firstorder knowledge. As a solution, it is proposed to understand knowledge orders as a nominal designation related to the evaluation of the position of knowledge in epistemic history (as this concept is understood by Alvin Goldman).
Keywords
epistemology,
knowledge,
KK principle,
knowledge orders,
metacognition,
positive introspection,
second order knowledge
Supporting agencies: This research was financially supported by the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus, project grant agreement no. 2023-30-033
About the Author
A. M. Kardash
Institute of Philosophy of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus
Belarus
Belarus
Aleksey M. Kardash – Postgraduate student
1 Surganov Str., Bldg 2, Minsk 220072
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